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The Problem of Presidential InabilityIt Must Be Solved Now
By John D. Feerick
The United States is today in a position where it has no elected
Vice President to succeed President Johnson. Mr. Feerick's
article will interest our readers as he discusses methods to correct
this situation.
N August 27, 1787, John Dickinson of
Delaware asked the Constitutional Convention these vital questions: "What is
the extent of the term 'disability' and who is to
be the judge of it ?" ' His questions regarding
the provision on executive succession were never
answered. Today, one hundred and seventy-six
years later, they remain unanswered. They
have been revived from time to time, usually
when a President has died or become disabled.
Hundreds of answers have been offered. None
has been found acceptable.
Although concern about the problem of presidential inability had been aroused by the EisenJohn D. Feerick
hower illnesses in 1955, 1956 and 1957, interest
had waned to such an extent by
"It is a tragic fact that it took a terrible
November 21, 1963 that the probcrime in Dallas to remind us of a serious
defect in our constitutional process." 8
lem was 'all but forgotten by the
Congress and the public.
On
Since the death of President
November 22, it almost caused a John F. Kennedy, there has been
national crisis. As one reporter
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then noted:
The Subcommittee on Constitu"For an all too brief hour today, it was
tional Amendments of the Senate
not clear again what would have happened if the young President, instead of Judiciary Committee, under the
being mortally wounded, had lingered a
chairmanship of Senator Birch
long time between life and death, strong
Bayh of Indiana, has been conductenough to survive but too weak to
ing extensive hearings on the subgovern." 2
ject. Again, various proposals have
Or, in the words of former Vice been offered. It remains to be seen
President Richard M. Nixon:
whether one will, this time, be ac12 The Records of the Federal Convencepted.
-l~k

tion of 1787, at 427 (Farrand ed. 1911 and
1937) (hereinafter cited as Farrand),
2 Reston, Why
America Weeps. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 23, 1963, p. 7, col. 7.

a Nixon, We Need a Vice President
Now, Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 18,
1964, p. 6.
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office of Vice President and the
adoption of a succession provision
which was essentially the same as
that quoted above with the exceptions of the substitution of the Vice
"In Case of the Removal of the PresiPresident for the President of
Resighis
Death,
or
of
Office,
from
dent
nation, or Inability to discharge the
the Senate, the inclusion of an
Powers and Duties of the said Office, "absence" contingency and the use
the Same shall devolve on the Vice Presiof the word "inability" instead of
dent, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, "disability." 5 On September 7, a
Resignation or Inability, both of the
clause providing that the LegisPresident and Vice President, declaring
what Officer shall then act as President, lature could declare by law what
and such Officer shall act accordingly,
officer would act as President in
until the Disability be removed, or a
case of the death, resignation, or
President shall be elected."
disability of both the President and
This provision is not clear on the Vice President was added to, the
following points: What devolves on draft.6 Finally, the draft of the
Is it the Constitution was referred to a Comthe Vice President?
"Office" or "the Powers and Duties mittee of Style which was authorof the said Office"? What is the ized only to "revise the style" of and
meaning of "Inability"? Who is "arrange" the articles agreed to by
authorized to determine the exis- the Convention. 7 It was given no
tence and termination of an in- power to effect substantive changes
ability?
in the matters submitted to it. On
Some assistance in interpreting September 12, this Committee rethe above provision is provided by turned a draft of the Constitution
an examination of the proceedings
which, except for a few changes,
of the Constitutional Convention of
of
1787. The first draft of the "suc- was to become the Constitution
"succession
The
States.
United
the
cession provision" of the Constituto the Comtion was presented to the Conven- provision" as submitted
as
follows:
read
Style
of
mittee
on
Detail
of
tion by a Committee
"Sec. 2: [I]n case of his removal as
August 6, 1787. It provided that
aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or
in case of the President's
or du-

The problem of presidential inability revolves around Article II,
Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution, which provides:

"removal ....
death, resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the President of the Senate
shall exercise those powers and duties,
until another President of the United
States be chosen, or until the disability
of the President be removed." 4

On September 4, a Committee of
Eleven which had been appointed
to study a number of matters, including succession, delivered a report to the Convention which
recommended the creation of an
4

2 Farrand at 186.

inability to discharge the powers

ties of his office the Vice President shall
exercise those powers and duties until

another President be chosen, or until the
inability of the President be removed."
"Sec. 1: The Legislature may declare by

law what officer of the United States
shall act as President in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President
and Vice President; and such Officer

shall act accordingly, until such disability
5 Id. at 493, 495.
6Id.at 535.
7Id. at 547, 553.

Interestingly, all its

members were lawyers-Alexander Hamil-

ton, William S. Johnson, Rufus King,
James Madison and Gouverneur Morris.
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be removed, or a President shall be
elected." 8

This draft contains the substance
intended by the Founding Fathers.
It makes it absolutely clear that they
intended merely to provide a temporary substitute for the President.
Only the powers and duties were to
devolve on the successor-he was
merely to "act" as President. In no
case, was he to "become" President.
This is further supported by the fact
that the words "shall be elected"
were intentionally chosen so as to
permit a special election. A suggestion to use the words "until the
time of electing a President shall
arrive" had been defeated in favor
of these words.'
There is no clue in the proceedings, however, regarding the intended definition of the word "inability" other than the use of that
particular word in preference to
"disability."
The term probably
was intended to be subject to a
broad construction, covering all circumstances which might cause a
President to be "unable" to discharge the powers and duties of his
office (e.g., mental and physical illness, coma, kidnaping, wartime capture, etc. ).
Nor does the Constitution grant
any explicit authority to any individual or body to make the determination that a President is "unable" to exercise his powers and
perform his duties. However, since
there is an explicit grant of power
in the clause, i.e., to the Vice President (or other successor) to exercise the powers and duties of President under certain circumstances, a
8Id. at 573, 575. The two sections were
separated from each other in the submitted
draft.
9Id. at 535.

good argument can be made that
the use of that power is at his discretion and that the only check on
him is the power of Congress to impeach him for "high crimes and
misdemeanors." It has been urged
that Congress has, under the
"Necessary and Proper" clause of
the Constitution, the authority to
make whatever laws are necessary
to execute this provision and that
it can, therefore, provide, by legislation, a method for determining
presidential inability.10 However,
since the Supreme Court has held
that this clause is applicable only to
specific grants of power " and since
the only specific grants of power in
question are those of the Vice President (or other successor) to exercise the President's powers and of
Congress to specify what officer
shall act as President when both
President and Vice President are
disabled, any legislation which
would take the determination from
the successor, or even interfere with
his exercise of discretion in the determination, would be of doubtful
constitutionality. 12
The problem of interpreting the
clause was further complicated
when, in 1841, President William
Henry Harrison died in office. His
Vice President, John Tyler, confronted for the first time in our history with the question of what the
role of the Vice President should be
when a President dies in office,
made a quick decision and, in the
face of heated objection, asserted
his right (by God, the Constitution,
10 E.g., Corwin, The President: Offices
and Powers, 1787-1957, at 54-55 (1957).
11 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 88
(1907).
12 See Brownell, Presidential Disability:

The Need for a ConstitutionalAmendment,
68 Yale L.J. 189, 205 (1958).
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and election, he said) to the office
and title of President.18 He thus
established the precedent that, upon
the death of a President, the Vice
President becomes President for the
remainder of the term. Since the
Constitution provides that "the
Same" devolves in all cases, this interpretation that the "office" devolves in cases of death was to cause
havoc when cases of presidential inability occurred in 1881 and 191-9.
President Garfield was shot by an
assassin on July 2, 1881 and
lingered for eighty days between
life and death. Vice President
Arthur, despite the urging of Garfield's Cabinet that he act as President, refused to do so for lack of
clear authority to make the determination that the President was
"unable" and for fear that if he did,
he would "become" President, oust
Garfield, and be labeled a usurper.
Thus, the government was, for a
period of nearly three months, in
a state of suspension. When Garfield died and Arthur became President, he pleaded with Congress to
find a solution to the problem. But
no proposed solution was found
satisfactory and the problem remained unsolved. 4
In 1919, when President Wilson
suffered a stroke which paralyzed
the left side of his body and was
confined to his quarters by his wife
and doctor who permitted almost no
one to see him, his Vice-President,
Thomas R. Marshall, like Arthur,
resisted the efforts of the Cabinet to
persuade him to discharge the duties
13 See the author's article, The Problem
of Presidential Inability-Will Congress
Ever Solve It?, 32 Fordham L. Rev. 73,
90-93 (October, 1963).
14 For a good account of the period, see
Silva, Presidential Succession, 52-57
(1951).

of the President. He, too, feared
that he had no authority to determine that the President was "unable" and that by acting as President he would become President.
Twenty-eight bills became law by
default of any action by the President. No official Cabinet meetings
took place until April, 1920. Mrs.
Wilson and Dr. Grayson were said
to be running the country. So,
again, nothing was done and the
administration of the country
simply drifted.'"
Eisenhower's heart attack on
September 25, 1955, his ileitis attack on June 8, 1956 and the stroke
causing a speech impairment on
November 25, 1957 revived concern about the possibility of there
being no one authorized to exercise
presidential powe.r during a presidential inability 16 and caused the
President to make a historic agreement with his Vice-President,
Richard M. Nixon, which set out
the following procedures to cover
cases of inability:
"(1) In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so inform the
Vice President, and the Vice President
would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the office
until the inability had ended.
"(2) In the event of an inability which
would prevent the President from so
communicating with the Vice President,
the Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under
the circumstances, would decide upon the
devolution of the powers and duties of
the office and would serve as Acting
President until the inability had ended.
"(3) The President, in either event,
would determine when the inability had
ended and at that time would resume the
15 For a good account of the period, see
Hansen, The Year We Had No President,
29-42 (1962).
16See generally, Nixon, Six Crises, 13181 (1962).
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full exercise of the powers and duties of
the office." 17

This agreement was, in turn,
adopted by President Kennedy and
Vice-President Johnson and later by
President Johnson and Speaker
McCormack. 18 It serves a useful
purpose, but it does not provide a
permanent solution to the problem. 9
First, it does not have the force of
law and would have no binding
effect if one or both of the parties
should decide to break it. Second,
it does not extend beyond the term
of the parties involved. Third, it
does not cover the situation where
the successor becomes disabled before the President. And, finally, it
does not solve the problem created
by the Tyler precedent, i.e., should
the Vice-President become President in cases of inability as well as
in cases of death ?
It is imperative that a solution
which would be both lasting and
constitutional be found now. It
would be tragic if the present opportunity to solve the problem of presidential inability were lost-and it
may well be lost if no solution is
generally agreed upon before the
next presidential election. A most
significant step in the effort to find
a solution which would be generally
satisfactory was taken in January of
this year by the American Bar Association when it called together in
Washington a group of lawyers
17White House Press Release, March 3,
1958.
18 See letter from Martin Taylor, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Constitution of the New York State Bar Association, to New York Times, December 22,
1963.
19 Shockingly, the 1947 succession law requires the Speaker to resign as Speaker
and Representative before he could act as
President in a case of inability, even if it
were for only a day.
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from different parts of the United
States who represented various
opinions on the problem.2 °
After two days of discussion, the
American Bar Association panel
issued a consensus which included
the following points: First, the
problem can be solved adequately
only by a constitutional amendment.
Second, the amendment must make
it clear that only the powers and
duties devolve in cases of inability
for the duration thereof, while the
office devolves in cases of death, removal and resignation. Third, the
method recommended by the panel
for determining the commencement
and termination of inability was as
follows: Inability would be established by declaration, in writing, of
the President. If he were unable
to make known his inability, it could
be established by the Vice-President
with the concurrence of a majority
of the Cabinet (or such other body
as Congress may by law designate).
(By "Cabinet" was meant the heads
of the executive departments.) The
termination of inability would be
established by the President, himself, in writing, but if the VicePresident and a majority of the
Cabinet (or such other body as Congress may designate) did not agree
20 They were: Herbert Brownell, former
Attorney General; Walter E. Craig, President of the American Bar Association;
Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law
School; Jonathan Gibson, Chicago attorney; Richard Hansen (author of The Year
We Had No President). Professor James
C. Kirby of Vanderbilt University; Ross
L. Malone, former Deputy Attorney General; Dean Charles B. Nutting of George
Washington University Law School; Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., president-elect of the ABA;
Sylvester Smith, Jr., former ABA president; Martin Taylor, Chairman of Federal
Constitution Committee of the New York
State Bar Association; Edward L. Wright,
Chairman of the ABA House of Delegates;
and the authior.
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that the President was able to resume his duties, his continued inability could be declared only by a
vote of two-thirds of the members
of each House of Congress. Finally,
the panel recommended that an
amendment provide that any
vacancy in the office of Vice-President be promptly filled through
nomination by the President and
election by a vote of a majority of
the members of Congress meeting
in joint session.
It was felt that a constitutional
amendment was necessary, in part,
because if legislation were passed it
would be prey for attack on constitutional grounds and such attack
would come, most likely, during a
time of inability-when the country
could least afford such attack."
The selection of the Vice-President and Cabinet to make the crucial
decision was based on several
factors: they are close to the President and would not exercise the
power except in a proper situation;
they usually would be aware of the
circumstances of an inability and
thus be in a good position to make

a swift decision if necessary; the
public would have confidence in
their decision; they would likely be
of the same party as the President;
and there would be no violation of
the principle of separation of
powers. The Vice-President, acting alone, was rejected on the
ground that he is an interested party
and therefore would likely be too reluctant to make a decision if an occasion required it. As for the
President himself having the final
say, as is the case under the existing
agreement, the panel rejected it,
mainly because of the possibility
of
22

21 The New York State Bar Association

dential authority in its formula, we surmise that it is much smaller than the risk
in the present arrangement, which makes

has consistently advocated a constitutional
amendment providing that the powers and
duties devolve in cases of inability and the

office in all other cases and that "the com-

mencement and termination of any inability

shall be determined by such method as Congress shall by law provide."

The panel

consensus was that the method should be
included in the amendment.

a mentally ill President.

It is imperative that a workable

solution be agreed upon now. 23 The

problem of presidential inability is
too potentially hazardous a problem
to leave unsolved. As the late
Senator Estes Kefauver said, "The
essence of statesmanship is to act
in advance to eliminate situations of
potential danger." It is hoped that
the Eighty-Eighth Congress will
act !
22 Said the Washington Post: "If there
is still some risk of confusion over presi-

it almost impossible to relieve the President

if he should be incapacitated." January 26,
1964.
23 For a listing of the various proposals,
see Feerick, op. cit. supra note 13, at 110120.
[End]

Insincerity
"All the skills of speech are of no use if our words are insincerely
spoken."
Wesley Wiksell, Do They Understand You? (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 20.

